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On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal formed under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea issued its decision on the proceeding brought by the Philippines against China 
relating to certain activities in the South China Sea. The Tribunal’s decision was hotly anticipated as it 
deals with various important issues relating to law of the sea and the interpretation of the Convention. It 
dealt with issues including the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, legal status of maritime features, historic 
rights and duty to preserve the marine environment. Although it remains to be seen whether States will 
follow the Tribunal’s precedent, questions arose on whether such precedent can be applied to other 
unresolved issues in other parts of the world. This article looks at the application of the precedent 
established by the South China Sea arbitration to the situation involving Dokdo between Korea and 
Japan. 
 
On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal formed under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
1
 issued its decision on the proceeding brought 
by the Philippines against China relating to certain activities in the South China Sea.
2
 The 
award deals with various important issues relating to law of the sea and the interpretation of 
UNCLOS, such as the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, legal status of maritime features, historic 
rights, and duty to preserve the marine environment. The impact of the award is felt 
worldwide, as it would undoubtedly influence other unresolved issues in other parts of the 
world involving islands and maritime features. This is the case particularly in East Asia, 
where the Republic of Korea’s (Korea) occupation of Dokdo is challenged by Japan.  
 
Like China and the Philippines, both Korea and Japan are parties to UNCLOS.
3
 Like 
China, South Korea on 18 April 2006 also made a declaration under paragraph 1 of Article 
298 to exclude the issue of maritime boundary delimitation and military activities in the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under 
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section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS.
4
 Despite of the fact that UNCLOS does not deal with any 
dispute regarding territorial sovereignty, and despite of China’s declaration to exclude 
maritime delimitation from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS, the 
Philippines managed to bring China in front of an arbitral tribunal and successfully obtained 
a ruling that some of China’s occupation and activities in the South China Sea are unlawful. 
Thus, can one party unilaterally bring a case under Part XV of UNCLOS on the issue of 
occupation and activities in Dokdo? This article will discuss the relevance of the award on 
the arbitration case between the Philippines and China, and its relevance to the issue between 
Japan and Korea regarding Dokdo. 
 
I. THE ARBITRATION CASE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINA 
 
The arbitration case against the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China) was brought 
by the Government of the Philippines on 22 January 2013, challenging China’s maritime 
claims in the South China Sea.
5
 The case was brought under the compulsory dispute 
settlement mechanism under UNCLOS, to which both the Philippines and China are parties.
6
 
In addition to challenging the legality of China’s maritime claims, the Philippines questions 
whether some features in the South China Sea are entitled to generate an EEZ even though 




Both China and the Philippines claim sovereignty over most of the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea. UNCLOS, however, does not prescribe any procedure for the 
determination of sovereignty and instead only sets out what maritime zones may be claimed 
from land territory (including islands), as well as the rights and jurisdiction of States in such 
maritime zones.
8
 In its Statement of Claim, the Philippines astutely avoids the question of 
sovereignty and argues that no matter who has sovereignty over the features in the South 
China Sea, there are still legal questions on whether some of those features are entitled to 




When the arbitration case was initiated, China asserted that the tribunal was formed 
without any legitimacy and thus did not join the proceeding to formally challenge the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the case.
10
 China has staunchly snubbed the proceeding and has 
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refused to participate in any stage of the arbitral process. China’s non-participation, however, 
does not prevent the arbitral proceedings from going ahead and the Tribunal from making an 
award.
11
 As the 16 December 2014 deadline set by the Tribunal for China to respond to the 
Philippines’ written submission got closer, China seemed to have changed its mind and 
decided that it was necessary to make its position known to the Tribunal, in one way or 
another. On 7 December 2014, exactly ten days before the deadline, China published a 





A. The Positions of the Philippines and China on the Arbitration Case 
 
Most of the features that can be considered as “islands” in the Spratly Islands are small, 
remote and not capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own.
13 
Thus, 
they are likely to be classified as “rocks”, and would only be entitled to a 12 nautical mile 
(M) territorial sea.
14
 This seems to be the position taken by the Philippines in this case, which 
prevents whoever owns the islands from claiming resources beyond 12 M of each “rock”.
15
 
Since most of these “rocks” are located within the 200 M limit of the Philippines’ EEZ 
entitlement generated from its main islands, the Philippines argues that the only disputed 
waters are the territorial seas surrounding each rock,
16
 thus leaving a large part of the waters 
and the seabed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Philippines does not 
recognize the legitimacy of China’s historic claim to the resources in and under the waters 
inside the nine-dash line, which is the main basis of China’s maritime claim.
17
 The 
Philippines also claimed that China has violated its rights under Articles 56 and 77 of 
UNCLOS and that there is a dispute between the parties on the interpretation of Article 121 





In the Position Paper, China argues that the case involves sovereignty disputes over 
land territories, which is not covered by UNCLOS. Even if the Tribunal decided to 
distinguish the sovereignty dispute from the maritime dispute, China argues that the maritime 
dispute is so intertwined with the issue of maritime delimitation that it is impossible to settle 
one without affecting the other.
19
 Since China has made a declaration to exclude any disputes 
concerning maritime delimitation from the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
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 China asserted that the tribunal was formed without any legitimacy and thus has 
refused to participate in any stage of the arbitral process.
21
 The Philippines argued that such 
disputes are not excluded by China’s declaration because they would not require the tribunal 
to delimit the maritime boundary in the area or determine which State has sovereignty over 




Although China has made it clear that the Position Paper should not be regarded as 
“China’s acceptance of or its participation in the arbitration”,
23
 it remains the only official 
statement of China’s position regarding its objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The 
Tribunal, having had no response or argument whatsoever to consider from China, seized 





B. The Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
Since the Tribunal has had formal arguments from both sides – at least on the issue of 
jurisdiction – it has decided to conduct a hearing to address the objections to jurisdiction as 
set out in China’s Position Paper.
25
 On 16 March 2015, the Philippines submitted a 
Supplemental Submission to The Hague-based Tribunal.
26
 The Supplemental Submission 
was in response to the request by the Tribunal for additional argument and information 
regarding both the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the merits of the Philippines’ claims challenging 
the lawfulness of China’s claims. The Tribunal gave China until 16 June 2015 to comment on 
the Philippines’ Supplemental Submission,
27





On 29 October 2015, the Tribunal issued its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
in which the Tribunal decided that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute regarding the 
interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS in relation to the status of Scarborough Shoal, 
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef as “islands” or “rocks”, as well as the 
status of Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, and McKennan Reef 
as low tide elevations.
29
 The Tribunal also found that it has jurisdiction to consider the 
disputes concerning China’s alleged interference with the traditional fishing activities of the 
Philippine nationals within the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal, the protection and 
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preservation of the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, as 
well as China’s law enforcement activities in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.
30
 The 
Tribunal, however, decided to reserve the decision on its jurisdiction with respect of the rest 
of the Philippines’ submissions, including the issue of maritime entitlement in the South 




The Tribunal issued its decision on the merits of the case on 12 July 2016. The 
decision gave an almost sweeping victory to the Philippines, where the Tribunal declared that 
China cannot use its nine-dash line
32
 to claim any rights over maritime resources or any 
entitlement to maritime zones.
33
 The Tribunal also declares that none of the maritime features 
in the Spratly Islands are capable in generating EEZ or continental shelf, effectively 
categorizing all maritime features there as a “rock” under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS.
34
 
Based on these findings, the Tribunal then concluded that China’s activities on and around 
certain features in the Spratly Islands were in detriment of Philippines’ rights and not 
consistent with UNCLOS.
35
 These activities will be discussed in more details below. 
 
II. RELEVANCE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DECISION TO THE DOKDO 
SITUATION 
 
Dokdo (Takeshima) is an island consisting of two islets, Dongdo and Seodo, located almost 
halfway between Korea and Japan in the East Sea (Sea of Japan).
36
 It has a total area of 56 
acres and is about 100-174 metres high.
37
 The island has been under continuous Korea’s 
administration since 1952,
38
 but this is challenged by Japan.
39
 The issue of Dokdo continues 
to be a source of tension and a thorn on the bilateral relationship between Korea and Japan. 
At one point in 1954, Japan even asked Korea to refer the dispute to the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), which was rejected by Korea.
40
 Korea does not see any reason why it should 
bring a matter concerning a territory that it exerts effective control over and that it consider to 
legally belonging to it to the ICJ.
41
 Without Korea’s consent, there is no chance that Japan 
could challenge Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo at the ICJ or other international tribunal. 
However, the award of the arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea dispute created a 
precedent on how a State can unilaterally bring another State to a third party adjudication. 
 
A. Sovereignty Issue 
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On the South China Sea dispute, UNCLOS is clear that it does not deal with any dispute 
regarding territorial sovereignty. Despite of this, the Philippines managed to successfully 
obtain a ruling that China’s occupation of Mischief Reef are unlawful.
42
 Since the Tribunal 
accepted that it has jurisdiction to hear the issue regarding China’s occupation of Mischief 
Reef, questions have been raised on whether such strategy can be deployed to other 
unresolved issues in other parts of the world involving islands and maritime features, 
especially Dokdo.  
 
As was the case with the South China Sea arbitration, any challenges to the 
sovereignty over Dokdo cannot be resolved by UNCLOS. So can similar strategy used in the 
South China Sea dispute be used in Dokdo situation? For example, can Japan unilaterally 
bring South Korea to arbitration to challenge the latter’s occupation of Dokdo? The short 
answer is no. The issue regarding “occupation” relates to sovereignty, which as mentioned 
above is not under the purview of UNCLOS.  
 
So how could the Arbitral Tribunal that was formed under UNCLOS in the South 
China Sea case ruled on the occupation of Mischief Reef? This relates to another claim 
brought by the Philippines in the case, which argued that Mischief Reef is not an island or 
rock, but a low tide elevation. The status of Mischief Reef is important in determining 
whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the occupation challenge. If Mischief Reef is 
deemed as an island – or even a rock for that matter – it is subject to sovereignty claim, and 
thus the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to hear any challenges on its occupation.
43
 
However, in its decision the Tribunal found that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation and not 
a rock or island entitled to any maritime zones.
44
 The consequence of this finding is that 
Mischief Reef is incapable of appropriation, by occupation or otherwise. Instead, jurisdiction 
over Mischief Reef lies on the coastal State in whose EEZ or continental shelf those features 
are located. In this case, the Tribunal ruled that Mischief Reef is located within Philippines’ 




The situation regarding Dokdo Island is different from Mischief Reef. Dokdo is a 
naturally formed land that is above water at high tide, which qualifies it as an island or at 
least a rock under Article 121 of UNCLOS. Neither Japan nor Korea ever challenged the 
status of Dokdo as a high tide feature that can be claimed under international law. Since 
Dokdo is subject to sovereignty claim, the sovereignty of Dokdo is not an issue under the 
purview of UNCLOS. Thus, Korea cannot be forced to go to the ICJ or other international 
tribunal to justify the legality of its occupation of Dokdo. 
 
B. Status of Dokdo as a Rock or an Island 
 
The Arbitral Tribunal’s determination in the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines 
and China included a long-awaited articulation of the distinction between “islands” capable 
of generating extended maritime claims (that is, EEZ and continental shelf entitlements) and 
“rocks” which can only generate a 12 M territorial sea. The decision set a high bar for a 
feature to constitute a “fully-fledged” island capable of generating the full suite of maritime 
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 In particular, the Tribunal determined that there are no islands in the Spratly group in 
the South China Sea capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf.
47
 Extension of this 
logic to Dokdo would likely lead to a conclusion that Dokdo is a rock, which only entitled to 
a 12 M territorial sea.  
 
The question is whether the Award in the South China Sea dispute will endure and be 
influential in future judicial determinations or whether State practice will evolve in a way that 
is inconsistent with the decision. The decision may either have diminishing influence on 
future cases as time goes on, or it might be treated as an authoritative ruling that will have 
enduring effect. If State practice supports the decision then the better legal view is that 
Dokdo would be treated as a rock. Yet will a future court take a broader view of “rock” for 
features which are close to the mainland? Coastal States typically favor maximizing their 
maritime jurisdiction by claiming full entitlement for even extremely small, remote, and 
unpopulated islands. This raised the prospect of State practice being unaffected by the 
Award.  
 
Whether State practice would follow the jurisprudence of the Award, the South China 
Sea Arbitration is now the starting point of discussion regarding whether a feature is a rock or 
island. The legal status of Dokdo may or may not be a dispute between Korea and Japan.  
Nevertheless, the approach in the Award, when applied, would seem to lead to a conclusion 
that Dokdo is a rock. 
 
C. The Delimitation Issue 
 
In the South China Sea arbitration, China argued that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction because 
the disputes submitted by the Philippines “would constitute an integral part of maritime 
delimitation between the two countries”.
48
 Although UNCLOS does contain provisions 
concerning the delimitation of maritime boundaries, China’s declaration under Article 298 
excluded the issue of maritime boundary delimitation from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
49
 This 
is a point that the Philippines were aware of, which was why it did not asked the Tribunal to 
delimit any maritime boundary between the Parties.
50
 In its decision, the Tribunal made it 
clear that it will only address the Philippines’ claims “only insofar as the two Parties’ 
respective rights and obligations are not dependent on any maritime boundary or where no 
delimitation of a boundary would be necessary because the application of the Convention 




Similarly, South Korea made a declaration under Article 298 to exclude any disputes 
relating to maritime delimitation and military activities in the EEZ from the compulsory 
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dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. Hence, any issue regarding maritime 
delimitation around Dokdo between the two countries cannot be brought under the 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. However, it is important to note 
that the characterization of Dokdo as a rock or island will have consequences for Korea’s 
claim of maritime jurisdiction around Dokdo, and the effect of Dokdo in any maritime 
delimitation with Japan. Given Dokdo’s location in the central part of the East Sea (Sea of 
Japan), its influence in determining the EEZ/continental shelf boundary delimitation between 
Korea and Japan is significant. Past jurisprudence on maritime delimitation cases and state 
practice suggest that a modified equidistance line, potentially including an enclaving or semi-
enclaving treatment of Dokdo, is a plausible final outcome. 
 
D. Fishing Activities Around Dokdo 
 
One of the claims brought by the Philippines was that China has interfered with the 
Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction to exploit the fisheries resources in its EEZ by 
enacting and enforcing “laws and regulations that purport to extend China’s law enforcement 
jurisdiction, including over fishing resources, throughout the entire area encompassed by the 
nine-dash line”.
52
 As part of its Article 298 Declaration, China has excluded any law 
enforcement activities relating to fisheries in its EEZ from the compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism. However, the Tribunal found that China has no EEZ entitlement around the 
Spratly Islands, leaving no overlap with the Philippines’ EEZ. Hence, China’s law 
enforcement activities within the Philippines’ EEZ are not excluded from the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal.  
 
The situation with Dokdo is slightly different from the South China Sea. Korea never 
claims EEZ generated from Dokdo. Despite of this, there is an overlap of entitlement 
between EEZ generated from Korean Peninsula and the EEZ generated from Japan’s 
archipelago. Although no EEZ boundaries have been agreed on the area, both countries have 
reached an agreement on fisheries that theoretically gives both parties equal fishing rights in 
the area, except within 12 M of Dokdo.
53
 Thus, unless Korea is enforcing its laws in the area 
designated to Japan based on the agreement, there is no way to challenge Korea’s law 
enforcement activities in its own EEZ as this has been excluded by Korea’s Article 298 
Declaration. 
 
The problem however, is less about fishing enforcement in the EEZ of Korea, and 
more about the possibility of Japanese fishermen fishing in the sea within 12 M of Dokdo – 
which had happened in the past.
54
 Article 298 excludes law enforcement activities regarding 
fisheries in the EEZ, but not in the territorial sea. In theory, any law enforcement issues 
within the 12 M territorial sea is subject to the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism of 
UNCLOS. However, in the Dokdo situation, any issue relating to the territorial sea of Dokdo 
depends on the sovereignty issue over the island, which is not under the purview of 
UNCLOS. Hence, any court or tribunals formed under UNCLOS would not have jurisdiction 
to decide on the matter. 
 
E. Preservation of the Marine Environment 
 
                                                     
52
 Ibid., at para. 686. 
53





Even if Japan cannot challenge the occupation of Dokdo to the dispute settlement mechanism 
under UNCLOS, can Japan challenge South Korean activities in the waters surrounding 
Dokdo? The short answer is yes. However, further examination of the kind of activities that 
can be challenged is needed. China – as well as South Korea – has made a declaration 
excluding any issue regarding military activities from the compulsory jurisdiction of 
UNCLOS. In the Mischief Reef situation, however, China has repeatedly stated that the 
construction is not military in nature. Thus, such construction activities are not excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  
 
 China’s massive construction projects raise serious concerns about their effects on the 
marine environment. China claims that the ecological environment of the South China Sea 
has not been damaged, and that the construction projects on the islands and reefs followed a 
high standard of environmental protection, taking into full consideration the protection of 
ecological environment and fishing resources.
55
 The Philippines slammed this assertion, 
stating that China’s ongoing reclamation activities “are causing irreversible and widespread 




This seems to be a valid argument raised by the Philippines. Since three of the 
features on which China is undertaking reclamation works in the South China Sea are either 
just inside or just outside the limit of the EEZ claimed by the Philippines, it is reasonable for 
the Philippines to argue that China has the obligation to notify the Philippines about its 
reclamation plans, to assess the environmental impact of the reclamation projects and to share 
the result of such assessment with the Philippines.
57
 Moreover, since the reefs being 
reclaimed by China are either being disputed or located in the middle of an area that is being 





Having established jurisdiction, the Tribunal considered the effect on the marine 
environment of China’s large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in 
the Spratly Islands and found that China has breached its obligation under Article 192 of 
UNLCOS to protect and preserve the marine environment.
59
 The Tribunal considers that 
given the scale and impact of the island-building activities, China was required to prepare an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and to communicate the results of the assessment.
60
 
The Tribunal found that China's failure to communicate the results of the EIAs that it had 
allegedly conducted with the Tribunal, Meeting of States Parties to the UNCLOS, or any 
other international organization, as breach of the obligation of co-operation enshrined under 
Article 206 of UNCLOS.
 61
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The duty to protect and preserve the marine environment is contained in Part XII of 
UNCLOS, which is applicable to all States with respect to the marine environment in all 
maritime areas, both inside the national jurisdiction of States and beyond it. In the East Sea 
(Sea of Japan) context, as a State party of UNCLOS, Korea is bound by the provisions of Part 
XII, and has a duty to protect and preserve the marine environment, not only in the waters 
surrounding Dokdo, but in all maritime areas. In conducting activities in the waters around 
Dokdo, Korea must ensure that such activities would not harm the marine environment. 
Following the Award, Korea should also aware that before conducting any activities around 
Dokdo that may affect the marine environment, Korea not only has to conduct an EIA, but 
also required to share the result of such assessment, including to Japan. If Korea fails to 
observe such obligation, it would be in violation of UNCLOS, and other State parties of 
UNCLOS – including Japan – could bring a claim against Korea regarding such violation. 
However, if such activities are military in nature, due to Korea’s declaration, they would be 





The issues regarding Dokdo between Korea and Japan are mainly related to Korea’s 
sovereignty over Dokdo which is challenged by Japan, as well as the effect Dokdo on 
maritime delimitation between the two countries. If international judicial dispute settlement is 
sought on both issues at the same time, the case could take a long time to be completed. 
Nevertheless, the determination of sovereignty over Dokdo without the logical second phase 
of delimitation of maritime boundary is unlikely to resolve the issue between Korea and 
Japan. It is unlikely, however, that the issues of sovereignty over Dokdo and maritime 
delimitation between Korea and Japan will be brought in front of an international judicial 
dispute settlement body without the consent of both parties. Dispute settlement mechanism 
under UNCLOS also would not be able to hear the disputes, not only because the issue 
sovereignty is outside of the scope of the Convention, but also because Korea and Japan have 
both expressly excluded maritime delimitation from the application of the dispute settlement 
mechanism under UNCLOS. Following this, since no international court or tribunal could 
resolve the sovereignty issue of Dokdo, any issue regarding fishing activities within 12 M of 
Dokdo also would not be able to be resolved, as this would depend on the determination of 
which country has sovereignty over Dokdo. 
 
However, the Arbitral Award in the case between the Philippines and China raises 
concern about the broad jurisdiction being assumed by arbitral tribunals – as well as by the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) – something that might lead Korea to 
engagement in a judicial case “by accident”. For example, action on the part of the Korea in 
the waters around Dokdo, for instance the construction of an ocean research station 
proximate to Dokdo as has been contemplated in recent years, could conceivably leave Korea 
open to involvement in a case brought by Japan under the dispute resolution mechanisms 
provided for under UNCLOS. This is because such activities on the part of Korea could be 
construed as matters directly related to the interpretation of aspects of UNCLOS, especially 
the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment under Article 192 and the duty 
to cooperate under Article 206. These questions would therefore not be covered by the 
exclusions set out in Article 298 of UNLCOS which Korea invoked in its Declaration of 18 
April 2006. While any such challenge could not address the question of sovereignty over 
Dokdo, such a development may be unwelcome from a Korean perspective, for instance 
11 
 
potentially leading to a judicial pronouncement not only concerning the lawfulness of 
activities undertaken by Korea and whether such actions constitute an aggravation of the 
dispute, but also concerning the status of Dokdo as an island or rock.  
